| 13.03.2003
By: Abdelrahim Saleh
Summary. Libyan-US relations have been plagued by a series
of incidents between American and Libyan armed forces, Libyan
policies of allegedly supporting terrorism, Libya's search
for chemical and nuclear weapons, and Libyan meddling in
other nations' internal affairs. Despite the fact that Qadhafi
implemented his own vision of the so-called "people's
participatory democracy", it is clear that Qadhafi,
his siblings and the remaining members of the "Revolutionary
Command Council" (RCC), created after the 1969 coup,
and their cohort of the so-called Revolutionary Committees
continue to exercise dictatorial authority over the Libyan
society.
The US has vigorously pushed the United Nations Security
Council to pass a few resolutions that placed sanctions
on Libya until it surrendered for trial, on 5 April 1999,
two operatives of the Libyan Intelligence Agency suspected
of bombing Pan Am flight 103 in 1988. The UN suspended the
sanctions the same day on which the suspects arrived to
the Netherlands. US sanctions against Libya remain in place.
Qadhafi has used his military in a 1977 border dispute
with Egypt, in 1972 and 1978 attempts to buttress Idi Amin
in Uganda, in several costly attempts to influence events
in Chad, and in a token deployment in Lebanon and several
other African nations. The US and other Western countries
in their dealing with the totalitarian regime never acknowledged
or paid any attention to the suffering of the Libyan people
or their lack of basic human rights.
Most Recent Developments. According to recent reports,
Libya offered $2.7 billion to the kin of the 270 Pan Am
103 victims and may accept responsibility for the vicious
bombing act as the Americans insisted from the beginning.
It is likely that this arrangement may prevail if Libya
met its obligations demanded by the US. Although a Libyan
government spokesman disavowed the story when it appeared
on May 2002, on June 2, 2002, another lawyer for the victims
repeated the story that each family would receive $10 million
in compensation. The press reports said the funds would
be paid in increments: $4 million when the United Nations
removed its sanctions against Libya, $4 million when the
United States dropped its sanctions, and the final $2 million
when the United States removed Libya from the terrorist
list.
The Libyan payments reportedly will be in addition to the
$500 million paid to the victims' families by insurance
companies. Finally, on 30 October, 2002, lawyers representing
Libya have signed the latest version of an offer to compensate
relatives of the 270 people killed in the Lockerbie bombing
in 1988, according to a letter made available at that time.
Reuters reported that the letter, circulated to the families
by the New York law firm Kreindler and Kreindler, made minor
changes to the June 2002 offer mentioned above but this
time it had the signatures of five lawyers representing
Libya. Under the offer, relatives would receive up to $10
million for each person who died in the explosion, in three
installments linked to the lifting of sanctions against
Libya. The lawyers signing for the Libyan side are Robert
Mirone, Anne Sefrioui, Mohamed Abdul Jawad, Azzam Eddeeb
and Ali Dawi. Indeed, it certainly looks like a deal may
be in the making for blood money in 2003.
A Brief Overview of Libya-US Relations
This overview is intended as a descriptive account and
thus is presented more like a chronology of events. The
reader is of course entitled to form his/her own analysis.
Due to the Cold War, the United States did not oppose the
1969 coup change in Libya because the RCC was anti-Soviet.
There are even those who claim that American intelligence
helped covertly the takeover by the young officers. Even
the RCC determination to hasten the scheduled British and
U.S. departure from Libyan military bases and the RCC pressure
on US and other foreign oil companies to concede higher
royalties and shared production ownership did not foul US-Libyan
relations. But, by 1973, when the United States withdrew
its Ambassador to protest Libya's support for "revolutionary"
and "terror" groups, Libyan-US relations had turned
sour and have not recovered ever since.
1973 Libyan Territorial Water Claim. On October 11, 1973,
Libya notified the US State Department that the Gulf of
Sidra was to be a closed bay and part of Libya's territorial
waters. Under international practice the opening across
a closed bay can be no more than 24 miles; the Gulf of Sidra
opening claimed by Libya was over 300 miles across. Also,
under international practice, Libya must have demonstrated
continuous and open control over the bay that was recognized
and accepted by other nations, conditions not met in the
Libyan claim. The United States rejected the Libyan claim
on February 11, 1974.
In 1978, US banned military equipment sales to Libya in
retaliation for Libyan support of terrorist groups. However,
On March 2, 1979 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris
Draper informed Congress that the Sate Department, having
received assurances that planes would be used only for the
Libyan national airline, has approved sale of three Boeing
747s and two 727s to Libya (New York Times, 3 March 1979,
p. A5). In response to such an approval, Republican Representative
Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey sponsored an amendment to
the Revised Export Administration Act that was accepted
and enacted by Congress. In accordance with this amendment,
State Department names Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen as
countries that, because of support for terrorism, may not
receive certain U.S. products; and exports of some other
goods is made contingent upon congressional approval.
1979 US Embassy Burned. On December 2, 1979, a suspicious
demonstration, apparently inspired by the Iranian seizure
of the US embassy in Teheran the month before, attacked
and burned the US embassy in Tripoli; no US citizens were
killed or injured. The press reported that Libyan authorities
might have a lot to do with instigating the whole thing
and did nothing to stop the mob. The embassy was closed
permanently in May 1980, after a series of assassinations
of Libyan dissidents in Europe. And on September 16, 1980,
a Libyan fighter aircraft fired at but missed an U.S. EC-135
reconnaissance plane over the Mediterranean. The United
States took no retaliatory action.
On March 1981, Secretary of State Department at the time,
Alexander M. Haig Jr., became the first American high official
to declare that the U.S. has evidence that "Libya is
running training camps for terrorists". This declaration
signaled the intent of the Reagan Administration to apply
pressure on the Libyan military regime. On May 6, 1981,
the United States ordered the Libyan diplomatic mission
(called the Libyan People's Bureau rather than embassy)
in Washington closed because it was suspected that Libyan
diplomatic personnel were involved in a wide range of illegal
(or at least undiplomatic) activities, including support
for international terrorism and intimidating Libyan dissidents
in the United States (New York Times, 7 May 1981, p. A1).
1981 Air Battle. On August 19, 1981, two Libyan SU-22 aircraft
fired an "Atoll" air-to-air missile at two US
F-14 aircraft from the carrier Nimitz over the Gulf of Sidra.
The Atoll missed but the F-14's did not; the US Navy pilots
shot down both Libyan aircraft. On October 15, 1981, the
United States deployed two AWACS planes to Egypt to patrol
the Egyptian-Libyan border area (New York Times, 20 August
1981, A1). On 28 October 1981, US imposed controls on exports
of small aircraft, helicopters, aircraft parts, and avionics
to Libya to "limit Libyan capacity to support military
adventures in neighboring countries".
On November 1981, US Exxon Oil Company abandons its Libyan
operations. (Wall Street Journal, 11 December 1981, p. 3).
The murder of U.S. defense attaché in Paris, on 6
December 1981, was linked by some observers to a possible
Libyan involvement. And on 7 December 1981 President Ronald
Reagan claimed that US has evidence that Libyan leader hassent
assassination teams to murder top US officials (Washington
Post, 11 December 1981, p. A28). Immediately after that
the Reagan administration called on 1,500 Americans residing
in Libya to leave "as soon as possible," citing
"the danger, which the Libyan regime poses to American
citizens." US passports were declared invalid for travel
to Libya (Washington Post, 11 December 1981, p. A1; Wall
Street Journal, 11 December 1981, p. 3).
1981 Assassination Attempts. Shortly after the August 1981
aircraft incident, the press widely reported that Libyan
"hit squads" had entered the United States to
assassinate top American officials including President Ronald
Reagan and Qadhafi was labeled "the most dangerous
man in the world". And on October 25, 1981, U.S. Ambassador
to Italy Maxwell Rabb was withdrawn from his post after
U.S. intelligence sources discovered a plot either to kidnap
or assassinate him. In November, someone fired at U.S. Ambassador
to France Christian Chapman. Secretary of State Alexander
Haig told a congressional committee that he suspected it
was Libyans that fired the shots. It is worth mentioning
here that an earlier suspected Libyan assassination plan
reportedly targeted US Ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts
was discovered in 1977. Also in November 1981, it was suspected
that Libya was responsible for explosives that was found
in music speakers to be used for an American embassy sponsored
dance in Khartoum, Sudan. On December 10, 1981, President
Reagan banned US travel to Libya and requested that all
US citizens leave Libya to avoid a hostage situation similar
to what happened in Iran in 1979.
In response to the call of the American government, US
oil firms agreed to withdraw US personnel but announced
that they will be replaced with other foreign technicians.
(Washington Post, 12 December 1981, p. A1). On 21 January
1982 Libya is reported to have rebuilt 400 heavy-duty trucks
(sold to Libya by Oshkosh Trucks) to carry tanks and for
other military purposes, despite written guarantees that
the vehicles would be used solely for agricultural purposes
(New York Times, 21 January 1982, p. A1).
Reagan embargoed, on 10 March 1982, crude oil imports from
Libya, invoking section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, and drawing on same national security findings made
in the case of Iranian oil in 1979. The presidential proclamation
stated: "Libyan policy and action supported by revenues
from the sale of oil imported into the United States are
inimical to United States national security." In addition,
US restricted exports of sophisticated oil, gas equipment,
and technology but did not impose retroactive controls or
embargo export of items that were available abroad (Wall
Street Journal, 9 November 1982, p. 39). In November of
the same year US State Department warned oil companies (notably
Charter Oil, and Coastal Corp.) against selling refined
products derived from Libyan crude in US. At the same time
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mounted opposition to
Libyan occupation of Chad and embarked on assisting Libyan
exiles that opposed the Libyan regime. CIA Director William
J. Casey said at the time, these activities might lead to
"ultimate" removal of Qadhafi." (Newsweek,
8 November 1982, p. 55; Wall Street Journal, 9 November
1982, p. 39). And in December 1982, US barred Boeing sale
of 12 commercial jets to the Libyan Arab Airline for $600
million (New York Times, 26 August 1983, p. A24).
1983 Air Incident and Air Surveillance. On February 1983,
the United States dispatched four AWACS planes to Egypt
to watch the Libya-Sudan border and monitor Libyan flights
toward Sudan. Two US Navy F-14 fighters intercepted two
Libyan fighters over the Gulf of Sidra in June 1983, but
neither side fired shots. In August, President Reagan deployed
two AWACS planes and eight F-15 interceptors to defend the
AWACS to Sudan in order to monitor Libyan flights. In August
1983, Libya began sending troops into Chad in the hope of
overthrowing the government of Hissen Habre. Although France
supported Habre, officials of the Reagan administration
were divided over export license application for shipment
of $40 million marine mooring system to Libya (New York
Times, 19 August 1983, p. A1, A6; 26 August 1983, p. A24).
In response to alleged Libyan bombing of Umm Durman, Sudan
on 18 March 1984, US sent two AWACS surveillance planes
to Egypt (Facts on File 1984, p. 197).
On 3 October 1984, US charged Libya with complicity in
laying of mines in the Red Sea (Facts on File 1984, p. 807)
and on 3 November 1985, the Washington Post reported that
President Reagan has authorized covert operation to undermine
the Qadhafi regime. The decision apparently was based on
a June 1984 CIA assessment that "no course of action
short of stimulating Qadhafi's fall will bring significant
and enduring change in Libyan policies." (Washington
Post, 3 November 1985, p. A1). Furthermore, on 15 November
1985, US barred imports of refined petroleum products from
Libya, which have increased following the opening of Ras
Lanuf petrochemical complex earlier that year (GAO 1987,
p. 18).
1985 Rome and Vienna Airport Attacks. On December 27, 1985,
20 civilians, including five US citizens, were killed and
110 people were wounded by simultaneous terrorist attacks
at the Rome and Vienna airports. American officials asserted
that Libya was involved in these operations. These coordinated
airport attacks were soon linked to Abu Nidal, the head
of a Palestinian faction, claiming he had received "a
considerable amount of assistance" from Qadhafi. White
House and State Department officials called on other governments
to exert economic pressure on Libya to halt its support
of terrorism (Washington Post, 31 December 1985, p. A1).
In addition, President Reagan invoked, on 7 January 1986,
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to implement
comprehensive trade and financial controls against Libya.
The Executive Order barred most exports and imports of goods,
technology, services (except for humanitarian purposes),
all loans or credits to the Libyan government, transactions
"relating to travel by a United States citizen or permanent
resident alien to Libya, or to activities by any such person
within Libya". However, Treasury regulations permit
re-exports of US goods to Libya that are substantially transformed
in a third country. Given the unwillingness of European
allies to join in sanctions against Libya, Reagan sent personal
letters to Western leaders asking them "not to undercut
US sanctions against Libya by replacing American oil companies
and workers being ordered out of that country". Administration
officials admitted, however, that they did not consult with
allies before taking action (New York Times, 8 January 1986,
p. A6; 9 January 1986, p. A1; and 10 January 1986, p. A6;
Wall Street Journal, 8 January 1986, p. 2; Washington Post,
8 January 1986, p. A1; and 10 January 1986, p. A30; GAO
1987, p. 11).
On 8 January 1986, President Reagan ordered to freeze all
Libyan government assets in US banks, including hundreds
of millions of dollars of deposits held in foreign branches
of American banks, as well as real estate property and other
investments. Actions were taken to preclude Libyan withdrawals,
to deter Libya from collecting on performance bonds placed
by US companies doing business with Libya and to guard against
Libyan expropriation of US assets (New York Times, 9 January
1986, p. A1; Wall Street Journal, 9 January 1986, p. 25;
New York Times, 11 January 1986, p. A4). Until now the US
Department of the Treasury is monitoring Libya's moves in
capital markets and keeping an eye on foreign investments
and secret bank accounts worldwide. Amount of Country Assets
Blocked by the United States January 2001(*)
Amount of Blocked Assets as of 2002 Country
Cuba $193.5 million (prior to § 2002 payment)
Iran $347.5 million
Iraq $1587 million
Libya $1072.2 million
North Korea $24 million
Sudan $33.3 million
Syria $249 million
(*) Source: Calendar Year 2000 Annual Report to the Congress
on Assets in the US Belonging to TeCountries or International
Terrorist Organizations, (January, 2001), OFAC, Department
of the Treasury.
As part of the intensive lobbying efforts against Qadhafi,
Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead began a scheduled
visit to nine NATO countries, 15 January 1986, in order
to seek their support for US sanctions against Libya (Washington
Post, 14 January 1986, p. A11). However, on 7 February 1986,
US revised sanctions to allow oil companies to continue
operations in Libya temporarily to avoid "abandonment
of contracts or concessions [which] would result in a substantial
economic windfall to Libya". The revision allowed sale
of Libyan crude at Libyan ports, but barred drilling for,
extracting, distributing, or marketing Libyan oil. In addition,
companies are expected to dispose of their Libyan holdings
"as soon as practicable on fair and appropriate terms,"
but no deadline is set (New York Times, 8 February 1986,
p. 33; Washington Post, 25 March 1986, p. A1; New York Times,
26 March 1986, p. A1).
1986 Air and Sea Battle. The U.S. Navy began a naval exercise
on January 23, 1986, in the Mediterranean north of the Gulf
of Sidra. The US reported that it followed accepted international
procedures and notified all interested countries, including
Libya, of the exercise. During the week of February 11-15,
1986, Libyan and US aircraft had more than a dozen encounters,
although neither side fired shots. On March 24, 1986, Libya
fired six SA-5 high altitude, long range, slow speed, surface-to-air
missiles and two SA-2 low altitude, short range, high speed
surface-to-air missiles at US aircraft but all missed their
targets. A-7 aircraft from US carriers knocked out the SA-5
installations, and repeated the attack four hours later
after the installation resumed activity. Also, A-6 carrier
based aircraft attacked and sank or damaged four small Libyan
attack boats that approached the US ships. On 24-25 March
1986, US Sixth Fleet had effectively challenged Qadhafi's
claim to territorial waters in Gulf of Sidra and had crossed
his so-called "Line of Death." (Washington Post,
15 April 1986, p. A1; New York Times, 15 April 1986, p.
A1).
1986 US Attack on Libya. A terrorist bomb killed three
people (two of whom were US Army personnel) and wounded
200 (60 of whom were U.S. citizens) in the LaBelle nightclub
in Berlin on April 5, 1986. At his April 9 press conference,
President Reagan said there was "considerable evidence"
that Libya was responsible for the explosion. On April 15,
some 100 U.S. aircraft — including US Air Force (USAF).
F-111s from the United Kingdom, carrier based A-6, A-7,
F/A-18, and F-14 aircraft, communications, reconnaissance,
and electronic warfare aircraft, and refueling tankers —
attacked two military complexes, two air bases, and a port
in Libya. Libyan sources said 70 people were killed in the
attack, including Qadhafi's adopted infant daughter. Two
USAF officers were killed when their F-111 was shot down.
Later on April 15, Libyan patrol boats fired two missiles
at a US Navy communications station on the Italian island
of Lamedusa, but the missiles fell short and the station
suffered no damage. In a message to the nation following
the April 15 raid, President Reagan cited, as the justification
for the US air raid on Libya, intercepted radio messages
between Libya and the Libyan embassy in East Berlin discussing
the April 5 Berlin nightclub bombing. Reagan stated that
"evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable"
(Washington Post, 15 April 1986, p. A1; New York Times,
15 April 1986, p. A1).
Although in hopes of forestalling US military response
to the West Berlin bombing, the European countries, on 14
April 1986, agreed to reduce the size of Libyan embassies
and restrict movements of Libyan diplomats in Europe, the
Americans went ahead with the attacks. While UK allowed
US to use British airfields for the exercise, France denied
over-flight rights for US planes reflecting the disunity
in the European position (New York Times, 15 April 1986,
p. A12; Washington Post, 15 April 1986, pp. A1, A23; New
York Times, 15 April 1986, p. A1). Moreover, the US succeeded
on 5 May 1986, to convince the leaders of the seven major
industrial countries at the Economic Summit in Tokyo to
cite Libya for its support of international terrorism, and
to list a broad range of measures from which each of them
could choose to act against countries supporting international
terrorism. The list included ,inter alia, arms embargoes,
limits on diplomatic missions, improved extradition procedures
for accused terrorists, and closer cooperation among law
enforcement agencies (Washington Post, 6 May 1986, pp. A1,
A14). On 5 May 1986, State Department officials announced
that special exemptions for US oil companies in Libya will
not be extended beyond 30 June. Companies noted that US
action would result in sale of their assets at "fire-sale"
prices, but that such losses will be minor since Libyan
operations are small share of their total business (New
York Times, 6 May 1986, p. A14).
The Libyan Arab Foreign Bank filed suit in London seeking
payment of funds blocked by Bankers Trust London under US
assets freeze on 13 May 1986. By 23 June 1986, the US Treasury
Department amended regulations on Libya to bar re-export
of goods incorporating US products from third countries
destined for Libyan petroleum industry (GAO 1987, p. 12).
And on 30 June 1986, the US Treasury revoked special exemptions
for US oil companies but authorized them to enter into standstill
agreements with Libyan authorities to maintain their ownership
rights for three years while they continue to negotiate
the sale of their assets to Libya. In the meantime, the
oil companies have no claim to current oil production, nor
are they obligated to pay current operating expenses. Of
more concern to the companies, they also have no claim under
the agreements to future reserves and would be locked out
if additional reserves were discovered in Libya while bilateral
relations remain hostile (GAO 1987, pp. 16-17).
In August 1986, some OPEC officials reported that France
has begun boycotting imports of refined Libyan oil products.
In a further attempt to destabilize the Libyan regime, the
Reagan administration sponsored a misinformation campaign
in opposition to Qadhafi (Wall Street Journal, 6 August
1986, p. 20). However, on 2 September of the same year,
the High Court of Justice in London ruled in favor of Libya
and ordered Bankers Trust London to transfer to Libyan Arab
Foreign Bank $131 million, plus accrued interest that has
been blocked by US assets freeze. US Treasury authorized
payment on 9 October 1986.
In late 1988, Reagan administration accused Libya of producing
chemical weapons at plant near the village of Rabta, south
of Tripoli. Although Libya claimed that the plant produces
only pharmaceuticals, production activities at the factory
ceased for over a year (New York Times, 8 March 1990, p.
A17).
Pan Am Flight 103. On 21 December 1988, Pan Am Flight 103
exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people. Early
suspicions, according to press accounts, fell on the Syrian-based
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General
Command or the government of Iran; the latter was suspected
of seeking revenge for the US Navy shooting down of an Iran
Air flight over the Persian Gulf in July 1988. However,
after a lengthy and costly investigation, UK officials and
US charged Libya with masterminding the bombing (US Department
of State 1995, Background Notes - Libya). Immediately after
this accusation, Qadhafi was reported to cut back funding
to numerous rebel movements and to ask them to close their
offices in Libya. Then, in an interview with the Egyptian
magazine Al Mussawar, Qadhafi admitted to having supported
terrorists in the past, but "when we discovered that
these groups were causing more harm than benefit to the
Arab cause, we halted our aid to them completely and withdrew
our support." The Libyan leader action paralleled a
drop in Libyan foreign reserves to under $3 billion in first
quarter of 1989 (Washington Post, 5 September 1989, p. A15;
New York Times, 26 1989, p. A8).
In January 1989, Just before the 3-year standstill agreements
were to expire, Reagan allowed US oil companies to return
to Libya via their European subsidiaries. Qadhafi, however,
refused to allow them to return, in effect continuing the
standstill arrangement and leaving US oil investments in
limbo. And on 19 September 1989, a French airliner, UTA
Flight 772, exploded over Niger, killing all persons aboard.
French investigators later uncovered evidence implicating
Libyan intelligence agents.
In March 1990 and within days of US intelligence reporting
that chemical weapons production has resumed at Rabta, Qadhafi
blamed West German agents for an alleged fire at the plant
that he claimed has caused extensive damage. US intelligence
agencies later concluded that such fire was an elaborate
hoax, that Rabta plant was intact and is capable of resuming
production (New York Times, 16 March 1990, p. A3; Washington
Post, 19 June 1990, p. A17). Qadhafi in May 1990, intervened
with Abu Nidal to obtain release of three Western hostages
two of whom were French and one was a Belgian. As a result,
Qadhafi received "the personal thanks" of French
President François Mitterrand (Washington Post, 27
May 1990, p. A35).
In June 1990 a heavily armed group of Palestinians was
captured off the coast of Israel. The Israelis claimed that
they were trained in Libya, transported in Libyan boats,
and accompanied by a Libyan adviser. A few months later,
Qadhafi expelled the radical Palestinian group responsible
for the failed planned attack (Washington Post, 7 June 1990,
p. A30; and 5 November 1990, p. A19).
Pan Am 103 Indictments. On the morning of Thursday, 14
November 1991, US, UK, and France issued a joint declaration
calling on Libya to surrender for trial those recently charged
in the Pan Am and UTA bombings. On 2 December 1991, the
European Community called on Libya to comply with the joint
demands and raised the possibility of sanctions if it does
not. Libya reportedly began to move its liquid assets out
of Britain and France to Switzerland and the Arab Gulf States.
But, on 4 December 1991, Libya arrested two men suspected
in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 but refused to extradite
them to the US or the UK. And in January 1992, in an effort
to stave off a British-backed resolution in the United Nations
Security Council imposing sanctions, Qadhafi moved to offer
to surrender the Pan Am suspects to an international tribunal.
However, the Security Council on 31 March 1992, rejected
the Libyan offer as inadequate, and imposed a total air
and arms embargo in response to Libya's continuing refusal
to extradite the suspects in the bombings (UN Security Council
Resolution 748). The resolution also restricts the number
of diplomats Libya can maintain abroad (Washington Post,
12 November 1993, p. A39).
On 14 May 1992, during remarks at a Non-Aligned Movement
meeting in Indonesia, Libyan Foreign Minister, at the time,
Ibrahim Mohammed Beshari claimed that Libya would abandon
terrorism. However, Libya continued to refuse to release
the two suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing. (Financial Times,
15 May 1992, 6). And in May 1993 Libya claimed that UN travel
sanctions have caused the death of over 800 people and cost
the country $2.2 billion in lost exports. Qadhafi appealed
to his North African neighbors to help broker a UN agreement
and hinted that Libya would try to open its borders to greater
investment and tourism in an effort to end its international
isolation (Financial Times, 10 May 1993, p. 6). However,
given Libya's continuing intransigence, the UN Security
Council voted on 11 November 1993 to ban the sale of petroleum
equipment to Libya and to freeze non-petroleum-related Libyan
government assets abroad. The sanctions fall short of a
US effort to prohibit the export of Libyan crude, a move
opposed by Germany and Italy. Russia reluctantly voted for
the resolution for fearing the lack of payment on its $4
billion military debt to Libya. While China, Pakistan, Morocco,
and Djibouti abstained. The resolution stated that sanctions
will be lifted if Libya agrees to extradite to the UK two
suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing. Libya offered to send
the two agents to stand trial in Switzerland, but both London
and Washington refused (Washington Post, 12 November 1993,
p. A39).
In April 1995 the State Department, in its annual terrorism
report, charged Libya with continued support of international
terrorists and involvement in overseas attacks against Libyan
dissidents (US Department of State 1995, Background Notes
- Libya). Libyan government meanwhile began, in September-
October, expelling foreign workers, citing the 1995 economic
hardship incurred as a result of the 1992 UN trade and travel
sanctions, and requested permission from the UN to charter
flights to repatriate migrant African workers in the country.
Tripoli hoped that these expulsions would put pressure on
the UN to relax its sanctions program (Financial Times,
19 October 1995, p. 8).
Legal, Diplomatic and Congressional Actions. On 11 December
1995, the UK expelled a Libyan diplomat from the special
interests section of the Saudi embassy on charges of espionage.
Libya retaliated by sending home a British diplomat from
the interest section of the Italian embassy in Tripoli.
(Financial Times, 12 December 1995, p. 7). In the US, the
Senate overwhelmingly approved, on 20 December 1995, the
Iran Foreign Oil Sanctions Act of 1995 to impose secondary
sanctions on companies that invest over $40 million in Iran's
oil and gas industries. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)
managed to add a last-minute amendment to the bill that
extends sanctions to Libya. (Inside US Trade, 22 December
1995, 6). In response to congressional pressure to pass
legislation to impose sanctions on Libya's investment partners,
the White House called on the United Nations to enact tighter
sanctions on oil equipment exports to Libya on 21 December
1995 (Wall Street Journal, 22 December 1995, p. A4). The
European Union (EU) immediately replied on 22 January 1996
with a letter to Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS),
strongly criticizing US efforts to impose extraterritorial
sanctions in relation to Iran and Libya. (Inside US Trade,
9 February 1996, 17). Thus, in frustration American Administration
officials, citing, on 8 May 1996, the potential for angering
European allies and undermining the UN effort to isolate
Tripoli, pressed Congress to terminate efforts to impose
secondary sanctions against foreign firms that invest in
Libya. (Inside US Trade, 10 May 1996, p. 16).
In May 1996, relatives of the victims of the Pan Am 103
bombing filed suit against the government of Libya, taking
advantage of the opportunities opened by the Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1996, which allows victims of terrorist acts abroad
to sue foreign countries in US courts (Washington Post,
7 May 1996, A13). And on 23 July 1996, Congress passed the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). The legislation mandates
sanctions when companies: invest more than $40 million in
gas and oil development in Libya, or export goods or technology
prohibited by UN resolutions which would help Libya acquire
weapons, or boost Libya's aviation capabilities. In response,
the president must impose two or more of the following six
sanctions:
1. Denial of credits from the US Export-Import Bank.
2. Denial of export licenses for controlled goods or technology.
3. Prohibition of loans of more than $10m from US financial
institutions for a 12-month period.
4. Prohibition of foreign financial institutions from dealing
in US government debt or US government funds.
5. Prohibition against participation in any US government
procurement project.
6. Import restrictions.
These sanctions were required to be in effect for up to
two years, and in "no case" can they be applied
for less than one year. But the bill allowed the President
to waive "all or part" of the sanctions against
a foreign company if doing so is deemed to be in the national
interest. The bill has a sunset provision that terminates
it five years after enactment (Financial Times, 25 July
1996, p. 4; Inside US Trade, 26 July 1996, p. 4; 104-172)
Second day on 24 July 1996, the EU expressed outrage at
the passage of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. The European
Commission announced that a regulation being drafted to
retaliate against US sanctions on foreign companies trafficking
in expropriated US property in Cuba (the Helms-Burton legislation)
could also be used to retaliate against the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act (New York Times, 25 July 96, p. A14)
On 31 July 1996, the UN Security Council issued a warning
to Qadhafi not to defy UN sanctions, and declared that his
expressed intention to fly anywhere he wishes, is in violation
of the air ban and is unacceptable (Journal of Commerce,
1 August 1996, p. 5A). And on 5 August 1996, President Clinton
signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act at a ceremony attended
by relatives of victims of the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 (New York Times, 6 August 1996, p. A1). Two days later,
on 8 August 1996 French President Jacques Chirac warned
the US of "immediate retaliation" if French companies
are to be targeted under the new Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act. French energy firms Total and Elf have expressed interest
in increasing investment in Iran and Libya (Journal of Commerce,
8 August 1996, 2A).
On 19 August 1996, German authorities arrested two men
on suspicion of smuggling high-technology equipment to Libya
to enable it to manufacture lethal nerve gas (Journal of
Commerce, 20 August 1996, p. 3A). And on 21 August 1996,
the EU announced that it would appeal to the World Trade
Organization if the US punishes any European companies for
doing business with Iran or Libya (Financial Times, 22 August
1996, p. 3).
After a trip to the Middle East and Libya in August 1996,
Louis Farrakhan applied to the US Treasury Department for
permission to accept a $1 billion donation from Qadhafi
(Wall Street Journal, 26 August 1996, p. A1). However, on
28 August 1996, US Treasury denied Farrakhan's application.
Congress later passed a broad legislation to prohibit such
transactions in the future (Financial Times, 30 August 1996,
5). The US even criticized Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin
Erbakan for visiting Libya on 7 October 1996 and signing
a new bilateral trade pact. Erbakan countered that his primary
objective was to secure repayment of an outstanding debt
of $300 million (New York Times, 8 October 1996, p. A5).
The Heavy Impact of Sanctions. On 14 October 1996, Libya
announced that UN sanctions are taking a "tragic toll"
on the country, costing $19 billion and causing as many
as 21,000 deaths in the past three and a half years. Libya
claimed that agriculture is the hardest-hit sector, with
losses estimated at $5.9 billion (International Herald Tribune,
14 October 1995, p. 13). Following the Libyan report on
the heavy impact of sanctions, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi
(ENI), Italy's state oil company, announced, on 5 November
1996, that it signed a deal in June 1996 to develop Libya's
natural-gas resources and build a pipeline to Italy for
an estimated $3 billion. (Wall Street Journal, 5 November
1996, p. A19).
On 1 January 1997 Libya sentenced to death six men accused
of passing defense secrets to foreign governments. According
to Egyptian experts, this case may be related to a military
coup attempt in October 1993 (Financial Times, 2 January
1997, p. 2; International Herald Tribune, 3 January 1997,
p. 3). And on 10 March 1997, in defiance of US efforts to
isolate the Qadhafi regime internationally, the Vatican
established full diplomatic relations with Libya to "recognize
recent positive results in the area of religious freedom."
(International Herald Tribune, 11 March 1997, p. 6). Again
on 5 May 1997, a group of US senators led by Edward M. Kennedy
urged US ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson to introduce
a Security Council resolution for an oil embargo, calling
it the only sanction likely to bring about Libyan compliance
with UN demands (Journal of Commerce, 5 May 1997, p. 3A).
Three days later, on 8 May 1997, Qadhafi violated UN sanctions
by flying to Niger to meet President Ibrahim Barré
Mainassara (Agence France-Presse, 13 May 1997; USA Today,
9 May 1997, p. 6A). And on 17 August 1997, four African
leaders-the presidents of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and
Niger-issued a statement calling on the UN to look into
the impact of economic sanctions on Libya. They met with
Qadhafi and jointly called on each country to "develop
their economic relations and reinforce the mechanisms of
cooperation with the goal of reinforcing stability in the
region." (Agence France-Presse, 17 August 1997). Furthermore,
on 21 September 1997, in defiance of UN sanctions against
Libya, the Arab League approved a resolution urging Arab
countries to "take measures to alleviate the sanctions
on Libya," including allowing Qadhafi to travel by
plane to member states. The resolution also authorized humanitarian
flights and encouraged member countries to release Libyan
non-oil funds frozen in Arab banks (New York Times, 22 September
1997).
According to the Seattle Times of 19 October 1997, the
Libyan government took the initiative to send letters to
families of victims of Pan Am 103, urging them to accept
a financial settlement and to oppose sanctions (Seattle
Times, 19 October 1997, p. A17). Also despite US opposition,
South African President Nelson Mandela traveled in October
1997 to Libya for a diplomatic visit; complying with UN
flight ban, he flew to a border town and arrived by road.
Mandela, who is grateful for Qadhafi's support in the fight
against Apartheid, is the most influential visitor to Libya
since the 1992 flight ban. He presented Qadhafi with South
Africa's "Order of Good Hope", the country's highest
award for a foreigner (Washington Post, 23 October 1997,
p. A27; Washington Post, 30 October 1997, p. A30).
On 2 December 1997, the New York Times reported that a
massive Libyan underground pipe project, the Great Man-Made
River Project, could serve as a conduit for troops and military
vehicles. The pipeline, made of pipes 13 feet in diameter,
has large underground storage facilities every 50 or 60
miles and runs through a mountain where intelligence sources
report Qadhafi is constructing a chemical and biological
weapons plant (New York Times, 2 December 1997, A1).
On 26 February 1998 US District Judge Thomas Platt ruled
that families of the victims of Pan Am 103 bombing can sue
the Libyan government. Lawyers argued that frozen Libyan
assets could be used to pay award damages to the families.
The decision was appealed by Libya (Newsday, 4 March 1998,
p. A28). In the following day, 27 February 1998, acting
on Libya's March 1992 complaint, the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague ruled that it has authority
to decide whether Libya must surrender two of its citizens
for trial over the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1988. The UK, France,
and US had unsuccessfully argued against ICJ involvement,
on the grounds that the UN Security Council's 1992 and 1993
resolutions precluded the court's involvement. Libya argued
that under the 1971 Montreal Convention against aviation
terrorism it is not required to extradite the two agents
and has the right to try the suspects itself or send them
to a neutral country for trial. Calling the ruling a victory,
Libya claimed the UN sanctions should be declared null and
void (New York Times, 28 February 1998, p. A4; Financial
Times, 28 February 1998, p. 4). On 20 March 1998, at the
request of the Libyan government, the UN Security Council
held a debate on sanctions against Libya. In response to
Libyan claims of injury, US Ambassador Richardson argued
that "if Libya suffered economically, it is certainly
not because of UN sanctions," and pointed out that
UN sanctions "are targeted sanctions, imposed to address
aspects of Libyan involvement in international terrorism,
but specifically designed to prevent suffering among the
Libyan people." (Agence France-Presse, 6 March 1998;
US Information Service, 20 March 1998; Washington Post,
21 March 1998, p. A18).
Libya agreed, on 12 April 1998, to let Germany question
its agents about a discotheque bombing that killed two US
servicemen and a Turkish woman in 1986 (WashPost, 12 April
1998, A20). And on 8 June 1998, the heads of state of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) called on African nations
to suspend compliance with the UN air embargo on Libya for
all religious, humanitarian, or OAU-related flights. The
OAU also asserted that it will ignore all sanctions on Libya
starting in September if the US and the UK have not agreed
by then to try the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects in a third
country. State Department spokesman James Rubin stated,
"We are extremely disturbed by this short-sighted action,
which constituted a direct assault on the authority of the
Security Council" and called on OAU member states to
ignore the OAU resolution (US Department of State, 10 June
1998; US Information Service, 12 June 1998).
On 24 August 1998 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
and UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook unveiled a proposal
to hold the trial of the two suspects in the Pan Am 103
bombing under Scottish law in a court in the Netherlands.
If convicted, the suspects are to serve time in British
prison. Albright stressed that the deal is a "take-it-or-leave-it
proposition" and that the US will push for additional
sanctions, including an oil embargo, if Libya refused the
offer (Washington Post, 25 August 1998, pp. A1, A11; Financial
Times, 25 August 1998, p. 5). The following day, 25 August
1998, the Arab League, Egypt, Sudan, and South African President
Nelson Mandela expressed support for the US-UK proposal
(Scotsman, 26 August 1998, p. 2; New York Times, 26 August
1998, p. A7).
The UN Security Council voted, on 27 August 1998, to suspend
sanctions on Libya if Qadhafi extradited the Pan Am 103
bombing suspects for trial in The Hague and cooperated with
the French investigation into the 1989 bombing of UTA Flight
772. The Security Council threatened additional measures
if Libya does not surrender the suspects for trial. Libyan
acceptance of the offer, however, will not necessarily end
unilateral American sanctions (Agence France-Presse, 6 September
1998; US Information Service, 28 August 1998; Financial
Times, 26 August 1998, p. 4; and 29-30 August 1998, p. 4;
New York Times, 25 August 1998, p. A9)
On 27 August 1998, having accepted the proposal in principle
a few days earlier, Qadhafi asked for a variety of guarantees
to ensure fair treatment of the suspects before he will
surrender them for trial in the Netherlands (Washington
Post, 28 August 1998, A26). In September 1998, the presidents
of Niger, Chad, Mali, Eritrea, and Sudan defied the UN air
embargo and flew to Libya to celebrate anniversary of Qadhafi's
accession to power in 1969 (Agence France-Presse, 6 September
1998). And on 29 September 1998, in a speech to the UN General
Assembly, Libya's UN ambassador, Abuzeid Dorda, described
the US-UK offer on the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects to be
"honey with a dose of poison." Dorda demanded
guarantees that the suspects will not be extradited to the
US or the UK and that if convicted they would serve their
sentences in a third country or in Libya (Washington Post,
27 October 1998, p. A16; Washington Post, 30 September 1998,
p. A20). But, the American and British officials maintained
that Libya's demand for the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects
to serve any sentence outside the US and the UK is not acceptable.
The US official said that "if Libya continues to press
its demand, there can be no agreement." (Washington
Post, 27 October 1998, p. A16).
On 5 December 1998 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who
met with Qadhafi in Libya to try to break the deadlock on
transferring the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects; described
their discussions as "fruitful and positive."
(Washington Post, 6 December 1998, p. A35). At a memorial
service marking the tenth anniversary of the Pan Am 103
bombing on 21 December 1998, President Clinton stated that
if Libya does not surrender the suspects for trial before
the UN reviews the sanctions against Libya in February,
the US will press for harsher sanctions (New York Times,
30 January 1999, p. A3; US Information Service, 21 December
1998).
On 26 February 1999, the US and Britain reiterated that
unless Qadhafi releases the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects
for trial within 30 days, they will press for more sanctions
in the UN Security Council. However, they failed to convince
the Security Council to impose a precise deadline (New York
Times, 27 February 1999, p. A3; Washington Post, 27 February
1999, p. A13). Finally after talks in Tripoli, South African
President Nelson Mandela announced on 19 March 1999 that
Libya agreed to hand over the suspects for trial on or before
April 6, 1999 (Financial Times, 20-21 March 1999, p. 1).
The French Airliner Case. Although this case relates more
to the Libyan-French relations, UTA 772 and Pan Am 103 became
rather linked in a bizarre long tale of murdering innocent
civilians in cold blood. On March 10, 1999, an anti-terrorism
French court convicted Qadhafi's brother-in-law and five
other Libyans in absentia and sentenced them to life in
prison in the 1987 bombing of a French passenger jet. Libya
had refused to hand over the suspects in the attack that
killed 170 people, making the French trial largely symbolic.
UTA Flight 772, en route to Paris from Brazzaville, Republic
of Congo, exploded over Niger, killing all the crew and
passengers. The debris was scattered over 50 miles of the
Tenere Desert. The six convicted included Abdallah Senoussi,
a brother-in-law of the Libyan leader. At the time of the
crash, Senoussi was the No. 2 man in Libya's intelligence
agency.
Investigators who reconstructed the aircraft in Paris concluded
that a suitcase loaded with explosives blew up in the baggage
compartment. In 1992, as we have stated earlier, the UN
Security Council imposed sanctions on Libya to try to force
the North African nation to surrender suspects in the UTA
bombing as well as two Libyans wanted in the 1988 bombing
of a Pan Am jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, that killed 270
people.
The sanctions limit diplomatic contacts, prohibit arms
sales and ban flights to and from Libya. France's top anti-terrorism
judge, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, spent about eight years investigating
the bombing of the French jet. In 1996, he traveled to Libya
to question Libyan nationals whose names had been implicated
in the probe, and was given a suitcase similar to the one
thought to have been used in the explosion.
The other defendants convicted in absentia were Abdessalam
Hammouda, Senoussi's top aide, suspected of supervising
the attack from Tripoli, the Libyan capital; Abdallah Elazragh,
a Libyan diplomat in Brazzaville suspected of giving the
suitcase to a passenger; Ibrahim Naeli and Musbah Arbas,
two suspected members of the Libyan secret service; and
Abdessalam Shibani, the alleged buyer of detonators in Germany.
While refusing to hand over the suspects, Qadhafi said
in 1996 he had no objection to them being tried in absentia
and would be willing to pay damages to the victims' families.
While at the same time, on 5 April 1999, the two Pan Am
103 bombing suspects, 47-year-old Abed Basset Ali Al-Megrahi
and 43-year-old Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, were delivered from
Libya to The Hague for trial. Three Scottish judges will
decide the case. If convicted, the men will serve their
sentences in a Scottish jail under UN supervision. Britain
reportedly assured Qadhafi that no witnesses would come
from Libya and that all witnesses would have immunity from
arrest. Britain also reportedly told Qadhafi that the evidence
was only against Al-Megrahi and Fhimah, and not against
higher members of the Libyan government. UN Secretary-General
Annan announced that UN sanctions against Libya will be
suspended, and can be lifted after 90 days. Annan gave Qadhafi
assurances that a new resolution would be needed to reinstate
the sanctions. The unilateral US sanctions, however, remained
in force. State Department spokesman James Rubin said the
US wants "additional concerns alleviated." (CNN.com,
5 April 1999; Wall Street Journal, 6 April 1999, p. A28;
Financial Times, 15 February 1999, p. 1; 6 April 1999, 12;
7 April 1999, p. 11).
On 29 April, 1999 Reuters reported that the United Stat,
in a major shift, will ease its sanctions policy to permit
food and medicine sales to Libya, Iran and Sudan so these
items are not used as a foreign policy "weapon'', officials
said. The decision -- long sought by farm state members
of Congress and businesses -- would permit case-by-case
consideration of food and medicine sales to Libya, Iran
and Sudan rather than banning them outright, American officials
said.
On the same day Qadhafi said the recent hand over of two
Lockerbie bombing suspects could lead to direct talks with
the United States and Britain, a Saudi Arabian newspaper
reported on 29 April 1999. Qadhafi was speaking in an interview
published in the Saudi Okadh newspaper. Asked if the recent
hand over of the Libyan suspects would lead to talks with
the United States and Britain, Qadhafi said this had been
agreed with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
On 30 April, 1999, former White House officials John Poindexter
and Oliver North are among nine Americans named in a Libyan
indictment related to the 1986 bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi
that was released at the United Nations. A 17-page letter
by Libyan United Nations representative Abuzeid Dorda was
circulated as a UN document to coincide with the 13th anniversary
of the US raid. President Ronald Reagan, who was not among
those indicted, ordered the attack on April 15, 1986, in
retaliation for Libya's alleged involvement in the bombing
of a West Berlin discotheque that killed two people, including
a US serviceman.
The Pan Am 103 Trial Preliminaries. Due to the importance
of the Pan Am 103 case, the following is a brief review
of the development before, during and after the trial. The
United States and the United Kingdom rejected 1993 and 1994
Libyan offers to send the two men to the Arab League or
a neutral site for trial, such as Egypt, Switzerland, or
the Netherlands. In August 1994, Libya accepted a proposal
offered by an Edinburgh law professor that the two be tried
at The Hague by Scottish judges following Scottish procedures
and law. On August 24, 1998, the United Kingdom and the
United States, and the families of some victims accepted
the Libyan offer for a trial in The Hague under Scottish
law. Libya reconfirmed its agreement on August 26.
After extensive negotiations, which at times included Egyptian,
Saudi, South African, and other national leaders, UN Secretary-General
Kufi Annan delivered assurances to Libya on February 17,
1999, that the trial would be limited to the two suspects
and would not address the issue of Libyan government involvement,
that the two suspects would not be interrogated by British
or American authorities, and that the two men, if convicted,
would serve their terms in Scottish jails under UN monitoring.
(The assurances were reported in the press; Secretary-General
Annan's letter was not released to the public until August
25, 2000.) Some people representing the victims apparently
believed that the letter proved their contention that the
United States, Britain, and Libya struck a deal to limit
the trial to the two men, which in turn amounted to granting
immunity for Qadhafi and the government of Libya.
Libya accepted the assurances, and the two men were transferred
to the Netherlands for trial on April 5, 1999. The same
day, the United Nations suspended, but did not drop, the
sanctions against Libya pending Libyan cooperation with
the court. The Secretary-General reported on June 30, 1999,
that Libya was cooperating but did not recommend permanently
dropping the sanctions. On December 9, 1999, the Judge ruled
against a defense motion to drop the murder conspiracy charge
because the alleged conspiracy did not take place in Scotland.
The judge ruled that the conspiracy existed despite national
borders. The two defendants pleaded not guilty on February
3, 2000. The judge granted a defense motion to delay the
trial and set the trial date for May 3, 2000. On April 25,
2000, the judge denied a prosecution request for delay of
several weeks to allow time to investigate the list of 119
witnesses presented by the defense.
The Trial. The trial began on May 3, 2000, before a three-judge
panel, and no jury. A fourth judge attended in case one
judge became incapacitated. Under Scottish law, the judges
may find the defendants guilty, not guilty, or not proven,
the last a verdict that frees the defendants without declaring
them innocent. Camp Zeist, a former US military base south
of Amsterdam was declared temporary Scottish territory while
the trial was in progress, and 200 Scottish policemen guarded
the site. Counsel represented each of the defendants, and
there were two prosecutors, the Lord Advocate and the Senior
Counsel. The trial was conducted in English with Arabic
translations for the defendants. The trial was televised
to remote locations in Scotland, London, New York, and Washington,
where victims' families followed the proceedings.
In September 2000, the defense attacked the credibility
of prosecution witness Abd al-Majid Giaka, a former Libyan
intelligence agent who also worked for the CIA, who claimed
that he saw the defendants with explosives and a suitcase
at the Malta airport. In mid-October, the prosecution turned
over to the defense evidence that reportedly implicated
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General
Command (PFLP-GC) in the Pan Am 103 bombing. The defense,
which has maintained since the trial began that the PFLP-GC
was behind the bombing, asked for and received a delay in
the trial to study the new evidence. On November 20, the
prosecution rested its case, after 232 witnesses and 72
days of testimony. The court rejected a defense plea that
there was no case to answer on November 28 and recessed
the trial until January 2001.
The trial resumed on January 4, 2001, but the defense rested
after only three days of testimony and three witnesses.
Apparently, the defense, making a huge error, believed that
the three judges would determine that the prosecution had
not presented a convincing case. In the opening argument
on January 9, 2001, the prosecution asked that only the
murder charge be considered and that the other charges be
dropped. The defense began closing arguments on January
11 and completed its arguments on January 18. On January
31, 2001, the three judges declared Al-Megrahi guilty, and
Fhimah not guilty. Fhimah left the court immediately to
return to Libya.
After receiving two extensions, Al-Megrahi filed an appeal
on June 10, 2001 that was accepted by a judge in chambers.
The prosecution does not have the right to appeal the Fhimah
not guilty verdict. Al-Megrahi's appeal, heard by a five-judge
panel, began in the Netherlands on January 24, 2002. On
February 6, 2002, the five judges agreed to hear new witnesses
concerning allegations that someone broke into Heathrow
Airport prior to Pan Am flight 103 and could have placed
a bomb on board the aircraft. On March 14, 2002, the five
judges rejected the appeal, and Al-Megrahi was transferred
to a Scottish prison where he will serve his life sentence.
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said "the
United States government welcomes the decision of the Scottish
High Court sitting in the Netherlands to uphold the conviction
of Al-Megrahi" for the bombing of the 1988 Pan Am Flight
103 that crashed over Lockerbie, Scotland. "This decision
affirming the conviction of a Libyan agent for the bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 represents a vindication of efforts
by successive United States administrations. It also underlines
the unshakable determination of the United States not to
forget, but to hold terrorists accountable for their acts."
Fleischer also said that the government of Libya should
now move quickly to satisfy its remaining obligations under
UN Security Council resolutions related to the bombing.
The government of Libya, he said, needs "to pay all
appropriate compensation to the families. They are in discussions
with the lawyers for the families. That's the appropriate
mechanism for the determination of the level of payment
to be arrived at. They have to acknowledge responsibility
in this matter, and to pay the reparations as n. Those are
the obligations that they have to fulfill under the United
Nations Security Council resolutions."
It is worth noting that in September 1999 - The European
Union decided to lift the sanctions imposed against Libya
in 1992 in connection with the Lockerbie bombing, further
tightened in 1986 on the allegation that Tripoli was supporting
terrorism. The decision was unanimously adopted in Brussels
by the foreign ministers of the 15-member EU countries,
which said the embargo on arms sales to Libya was maintained.
The other sanctions included restrictions on the movement
of Libyan diplomatic and consular staff, reduction of staff
in Libyan diplomatic and consular missions, as well as restrictive
provisions on the delivery of visas to Libyan nationals.
The decision followed a report by UN secretary-general,
Kofi Annan, on the Libya's decision to renounce terrorism
and respect UN resolutions. The EU is to propose to other
partners in the Euro- Mediterranean process in Barcelona
that Libya be admitted as a full member of the process,
which is the mechanism for co- operation between European
and the Mediterranean countries.
It is estimated that the Lockerbie trial cost about $80
million, lasted 85 days, recorded over 10,000 pages of testimony,
and heard 235 witnesses, only three of whom were called
by the defense. The appeals process has cost an additional
$38 million, beginning in January 2001. The families of
the Pan Am 103 victims filed civil suits against Libya,
and the United States and the United Kingdom will continue
to seek compensation for the victims.
A Final Concluding Thought. After Bin Laden's horrific
attacks on America on 9/11/2001, Qadhafi has offered intelligence
information to the CIA and British secret services. He attempted
to capitalize on the tragedy to project himself as a fighter
against extremism and tried to use it to tarnish some Libyan
opposition figures abroad. Fearing similar developments
to those against Saddam Hussein of Iraq, the regime's rhetoric
has turned milder and Qadhafi is slowly walking the fine
line between a complete capitulation to the US and the West
and his own political survival as the leader-for-life to
the "Great Jamahiryah"! Is this change temporary
or permanent? Only time could tell.
March 12, 2003 rahim@enter.net
Thursday, 13 March, 2003
|
